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I. INTRODUCTION
Women's prisons are experiencing considerable growth in the crim-
inal justice system.' In 1980, more than 12,000 women were housed
in federal and state prisons.2 The numbers have steadily increased,
totaling almost 60,000 women who are currently being held in federal
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA.
L. REv. 2151, 2196 (1995).
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON 7
(1991). See also Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 2196.
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and state prisons. 3 Since the early 1980s, the growth rate in the
number of women prisoners has almost doubled that of male prison-
ers. The male prison population has grown by 214%, while the female
prison population has grown by 386%.4 The number of female in-
mates is still small, however, when compared to the number of male
inmates.5
This difference in numbers has led to increased disparities in the
treatment of male and female prisoners.6 For example, male prison-
ers usually are placed in separate institutions according to their se-
curity risk, whereas it is impractical to provide maximum and
minimum security risk prisons for the relatively small number of fe-
male inmates. Similarly, women's prisons are often unable to offer
medical and counseling services that are as complete as those in
larger men's prisons.7 Many educational and vocational programs
available to men are scaled down considerably or are not offered at all
to women.8
Historically, women have been incarcerated with no particular
mandate for what to do with them.9 Although courts often give lip
service to providing equal protection for women once they are confined
to prisons, the equal treatment often ends when the women actually
enter the prison system. Typically, the programs and vocational serv-
ices offered to women prisoners are enacted to help women fulfill their
traditional homemaking roles. Most women's prisons offer programs
that reflect the outdated attitude prevalent in the 1960s. As such,
programs like sewing, decals application, handicrafts, and cooking are
the most common training programs available to women, whereas
men's prisons offer a wide variety of vocational training.10
3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1994, at
8 (1995). See also Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 2196-97.
4. BuREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 8
(1995).
5. Women constitute only 6.1% of the total national prison population. In 1994, Ne-
braska had 157 female inmates, which comprised 6% of all inmates in Nebraska.
Id. at 6.
6. See Barry Ruback, The Sexually Integrated Prison, in COED PRISON 33, 34 (John
Ortiz Smykla ed., 1980).
7. Id. at 35.
8. Id.
9. See NICOLE H. RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL
xxxii (2d ed. 1990). See also Donna L. Laddy, Can Women Prisoners Be
Carpenters? A Proposed Analysis for Equal Protection Claims of Gender Discrim-
ination in Education and Vocational Programming at Women's Prisons, 5 TmP'.
POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REv. 1, 17 (1995).
10. Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 2198. For example,
Men's prisons in Michigan offer vocational training in twenty areas, but
until recently, the women's prison offered only five programs-most fo-
cused on such skills as short-order cooking and handicrafts. In Idaho,
the women's prison offers only two vocational programs, one of which
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Although "inmates do not have a constitutional right to vocational
or educational programs per se,"1 1 disparities in access to these pro-
grams may violate the United States Constitution.12 When classifica-
tions have been based on gender, courts have held that the
classification must be analyzed under a heightened scrutiny stan-
dard.i3 The Eighth Circuit, in Klinger v. Department of Corrections,14
however, frustrated any possibility for women inmates to ever estab-
lish an equal protection violation for inferior programs and services in
the prison context.
This Note will discuss the Eighth Circuit's decision in Klinger and
will argue that its conclusion rested on a fundamental misapplication
of the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court for
the analysis of gender-based equal protection claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Part II will present the background of the
Klinger decision specifically and the position of incarcerated women
generally. Parts III and IV will discuss the scrutiny standard applica-
ble to equal protection claims based on gender discrimination and will
conclude that the Eighth Circuit was wrong to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims without applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. Part V will
discuss the Eighth Circuit's imposition of a threshold standard, man-
dating that plaintiffs prove that they are similarly situated to male
prisoners. Part VI will discuss the Eighth Circuit's alternate holding
that even if women prisoners are similarly situated to male prisoners,
the classification was not facially invalid and thus plaintiffs must
prove intentional discrimination. Finally, Part VII will analyze the
impact the Eighth Circuit's opinion has had on subsequent equal pro-
tection litigation.
teaches the women how to make decals. In Louisiana, the only program
for women is a sewing class. In Montana, the women's prison has job
slots available to only 18% of the inmates, and only two programs are
offered-sewing and data entry. The Nevada prison system offers male
inmates vocational training in a wide variety of positions, but the women
can choose only from domestic jobs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK-BYRNE, WOiEN, PRISON & CRIm 169 (1990).
12. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)(explaining
that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by requiring a special
permit for a proposed group home for the mentally retarded as the requirement
was not rationally related to any permissible government purpose).
13. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)(explaining
the Court's use of heightened scrutiny in gender-based classifications); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)(holding that an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion must support a gender classification).
14. 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1185 (1995).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Nebraska Center for Women (NCW) is the only prison for wo-
men in the State of Nebraska. Because women are housed only in
NCW based solely on their gender, female inmates consequently can
receive only those educational programs and services offered at
NCW.15 Men, on the other hand, are incarcerated in a number of dif-
ferent prison facilities depending upon a variety of penological consid-
erations, which range from an inmate's custody level to his
programming needs.16
Male inmates in Nebraska can be housed in one of four penal insti-
tutions. The Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP) normally houses the
medium and maximum security inmates. The other three institutions
generally house the minimum security inmates.1 7 At the time of the
lawsuit, the female population at NCW ranged from approximately
ninety to 130 inmates and included inmates with minimum, medium,
and maximum security designations. During the same period, the
male population at NSP ranged from approximately 650 to 800
inmates. S
Nebraska assigns male and female prisoners to sex-segregated
prisons that provide male and female prisoners access to a different
constellation of services and programs. Many of the educational, voca-
tional, and recreational programs and services available to female
prisoners in Nebraska are manifestly inferior to those offered to male
prisoners. 19 Allocating such programs reflects indifference, bias, and
stereotypical notions of women's roles in society.2o
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals came face to face with the is-
sue of opportunities provided to women incarcerated in Nebraska. In
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, a class action suit was filed by
female inmates at NCW. These plaintiffs contended that they re-
ceived inferior and unequal prison programs and services compared to
those provided to the male inmates at NSP and, accordingly, the fe-
male inmates' rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause had been violated.21 The women were con-
15. Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1388 (D.
Neb. 1993), rev'd, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994).
16. Id. at 1382.
17. Id. at 1381.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1396-431.
20. Id.
21. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Essentially, the Equal Protection Clause denies the states the power to
"legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that
statute." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
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cerned specifically about inferior programs such as education and
services that were offered at NCW.22
Believing they were treated unfairly, some of the women prepared
a written grievance and circulated it among the other inmates at
NCW. The NCW superintendent acknowledged receipt of the griev-
ance, but refused to address the issues that the grievance raised be-
cause it required certain comparisons that the NCW staff refused to
make. The superintendent suggested to the NCW inmates that they
submit the grievance to the director of the Nebraska Department of
Correctional Services (DCS).23 As suggested, the inmates submitted
the letter to the DCS. The DCS responded by denying that inequality
existed for the NCW inmates, but did promise relief in three main ar-
eas: lack of equal pay, lack of visitation for inmates during their ini-
tial orientation at the prison, and lack of inmate training in legal
research.24 Relief was also granted in some minor respects, such as
equalizing when the lights had to be turned off for the night in both
the male and female facilities. Despite the DCS's promises, after four
months equal pay had not been established and no inmate had com-
pleted training in legal research.25 Consequently, the inmates filed a
pro se complaint in the United States District Court of Nebraska on
July 20, 1988.26
In nearly every area of prison programming, the district court
found that the female inmates were burdened by comparatively infer-
ior programs and services, which could not be justified by an impor-
tant state interest. Equal protection violations were found in the
following areas: postsecondary and vocational education; prison law
libraries; medical, dental, and mental health care; inmate pay; preem-
22. Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (D.
Neb. 1993).
23. Id. at 1381-82.
24. Id. at 1382.
25. Id.
26. In addition to their equal protection claim, the plaintiffs also alleged that the
inferior education and vocational training violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, and that the inadequate law library violated the plaintiffs'
right of meaningful access to the courts. The plaintiffs initially prevailed on both
claims. See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374,
1432-35 (D. Neb. 1993). The defendants then brought an interlocutory appeal.
On remand from the Eighth Circuit, the district court, in 2 separate opinions,
reversed itself on the Title IX claim, but affirmed its holding that the plaintiffs
were denied meaningful access to the courts. See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 887 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (D. Neb. 1995); Klinger v. Ne-
braska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 902 F. Supp. 1036, 1040-41 (D. Neb. 1995).
After the entry of final judgment, both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish either a viola-
tion of Title IX or meaningful access to the courts. See Klinger v. Department of
Corrections, 107 F.3d 609, 614-18 (8th Cir. 1997). Further analysis of these is-
sues is beyond the scope of this Note.
19971
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ployment training; prerelease programs; and recreational opportuni-
ties.2 7 Without exception, the court concluded the disparate
treatment in each area was predicated upon inaccurate, irrelevant, or
pretextual stereotypical assumptions about women that served to de-
value women inmates.28
Interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)29 was
granted. The issue on appeal was confined to consideration of the
proper legal analysis to be applied to claims of gender discrimination
in prisons under the Equal Protection Clause. The Eighth Circuit was
asked to consider three issues, focusing exclusively upon the equal
protection violations found by the district court:
(1) Did the court correctly determine that the female inmates at the Nebraska
Center for Women are similarly situated to the male inmates at the Nebraska
State Penitentiary for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause regarding the
programs and services challenged by the plaintiffs?
(2) Did the court correctly determine that "heightened scrutiny" as opposed to
"rational basis" scrutiny is the proper level of scrutiny to judge the equal pro-
tection claims of the female inmates at the Nebraska Center for Women, and
if so, did the court correctly apply "heightened scrutiny" to the facts?
(3) Did the court correctly conclude that the Equal Protection Clause requires
the State of Nebraska to provide programs and services to female inmates at
NCW which are "substantially equivalent" to or in parity with the programs
and services provided male inmates at the Nebraska State Penitentiary and,
if so, did the court correctly apply such concepts to the facts?3 0
The appellate court addressed only the first of these issues and, with
one judge dissenting, concluded as a threshold matter that female in-
mates at NCW and male inmates at NSP were not "similarly situated"
under the Equal Protection Clause for purposes of comparing prison
programs and services. The majority of the Eighth Circuit panel held
that the plaintiffs did not sustain a threshold burden, imposed by the
panel, of demonstrating that they were similarly situated to male in-
mates for purposes of analyzing prison programs and services. 3 1 The
court held that the first step in an equal protection case is "determin-
ing whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that she was treated dif-
ferently than others who were similarly situated to her."32 According
27. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4-5, Klinger v. Ne-
braska Dep't of Corrections, 513 U.S. 1185 (1995)(No. 94-7589).
28. See id. at 5.
29. Section 1292(b) contemplates that the court, having decided one or several issues
that are closely related to the ultimate disposition of claims and defenses ad-
vanced by the parties, may deem it advisable to certify its decisions for interlocu-
tory review to obtain a definite ruling that may materially advance dispositions of
a party's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1995). See, e.g., United States v. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 782 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
30. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 729.
32. Id. at 731.
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to the majority, the inmates failed to demonstrate that they were simi-
larly situated to the male inmates at NSP.
The court reasoned that the two penal institutions were not similar
because different inmates were housed in each institution and each
operated with limited resources to fulfill different specific needs. 33
Hence, the court reasoned that "comparing programs at NSP to those
at NCW is like the proverbial comparison of apples to oranges."3 4 The
court also noted that "using an inter-prison program comparison to
analyze equal protection claims improperly assumes that the Consti-
tution requires all prisons to have similar program priorities and to
allocate resources similarly."35
The court further reasoned that because courts have little exper-
tise in the "inordinately difficult task of running prisons, courts should
accord a high degree of deference to prison authorities."3 6 As such,
subjecting prison officials' decisions to close scrutiny "distorts the deci-
sionmaking process" and "seriously hampers officials' ability to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administra-
tion."3 7 In establishing this reduced burden, the majority foreclosed
the application of heightened scrutiny to the important question of
whether denying women prisoners the benefits and opportunities
made available to male prisoners is constitutional.
The majority also held that the district court erroneously assumed
the case involved a facial gender classification.3 8 Further, the appeals
panel concluded that the district court erred in shifting the burden to
the defendants to justify differences in prison programming on sex-
neutral grounds.3 9 As such, in this alternate holding, the court held
that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of establishing that the
discrimination at issue was intentional. Under either theory, the in-
mates equal protection claims were consequently dismissed.40
III. STANDARD OF SCRUTINY APPLICABLE IN EQUAL
PROTECTION CASES
Depending on the type of claim at issue, federal courts apply one of
three analytical models to analyze whether state action violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution: a rational
basis standard, a heightened scrutiny standard, or a strict scrutiny
standard. As early as 1819, the Supreme Court created the ground-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 733.
35. Id. at 732.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).




work for the rational basis standard. Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained the constitutional limits of congressional authority: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional."41 Under this rational basis stan-
dard, courts typically apply a dual analysis to review state action. The
state's ends need only be legitimate, and the means chosen need only
be rationally related to those ends.42 The rational relationship por-
tion of the standard is quite broad. Courts need only inquire whether
the classification bears a rational relationship to the ends.43
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged that a higher
degree of analysis was required for gender classifications in the 1970s.
This recognition coincided with an increase in political awareness of
women's social, political, and economic position and with an increase
in the number of gender-based laws passed into legislation. For a five
year period, the Court struggled with the appropriate standard of re-
view to be applied in gender-based discrimination. 44 It soon became
clear that the Supreme Court would no longer treat sex-based classifi-
cations with the judicial deference given to economic regulations. It
became equally clear, however, that the Court would not impose strict
scrutiny for such classifications either. 45 Strict scrutiny is imposed
when the group challenging the state action is classified as a "suspect
class." A suspect classification is found where the regulations dispa-
rately burden groups historically subjected to discriminatory treat-
ment.46 Such groups are typically composed of either racial or ethnic
minorities.
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
42. See JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTONAL LAw 574-75 (4th ed.
1991). Nowak and Rotunda comment further that
[iin recent years the equal protection guarantee has become the single
most important concept in the Constitution for the protection of individ-
ual rights. As we have seen, substantive due process analysis was dis-
claimed after 1937 and the justices today are not willing to restrict the
legislative ability to deal with a subject under that analysis. And the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment has never
been a meaningful vehicle for the judicial review of state actions,
although it may have been intended to be a primary safeguard of natural
law rights by the drafters of the amendments.
Id. at 568 (footnotes omitted). See also Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection
in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulations" or "New Articulations"?, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 337, 342 (1994).
43. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
44. NowAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 42, at 734.
45. Id.
46. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). In 1944, the
United States Supreme Court, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), determined that deference to governmental action would be inappropriate
where disparate treatment was based on race or national origin. Instead, the
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1997] FEMALE PRISONER EQUAL PROTECTION 379
The Supreme Court finally delineated a higher standard for a clas-
sification based on gender in Reed v. Reed.47 In Reed, the Court held
that the intermediate classification must "rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."48 Based on this articulation of the intermediate scru-
tiny standard, the Court invalidated an Idaho statute that appointed
male rather than female administrators to intestate decedents' es-
tates. The Court disagreed with the State's argument that reducing
the workload on probate courts and avoiding intrafamily controversy
were important enough justifications to sustain the legislation.49
Reed laid the groundwork for future decisions.
In Craig v. Boren,50 the Supreme Court held that the decision in
Reed was controlling5 and that "outdated misconceptions concerning
the role of females in the home rather than in the marketplace and
world of ideas" would not sustain the States' burden to prove the legit-
imacy of regulations or statutes.52 As such, the Court began to recog-
nize the need for a higher level of scrutiny when evaluating state
action regarding certain classifications.
The Court in Craig invalidated an Oklahoma statute that prohib-
ited the sale of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females
under the age of eighteen. The Court began its analysis by referring
to the reminder in Reed that statutory classifications distinguishing
between males and females are "subject to scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause" and that the rational basis standard did not suffi-
ciently protect the interests from invasions by the state.53 Thus, ap-
plying heightened scrutiny as a standard for evaluating state action
requires the challenged regulation to be "substantially related" to an
"important governmental interest."5 4 As in Reed, the Craig Court de-
clared that outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in
the home were loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting
the state schemes.55 As a result, the Court held that Oklahoma's gen-
der-based statute constituted a denial of equal protection to males
Court held that such government action would be subject to "the most rigid scru-
tiny." Id. at 216. Under this standard, the action must be necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental purpose.
47. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
48. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)).
49. Id.
50. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
51. Id. at 199.
52. Id. at 198-99.
53. Id. at 197.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 198-99.
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ages eighteen to twenty.5 6 The Supreme Court has adhered to this
standard ever since.57
The Court affirmed this standard of gender based classification
twenty years later by requiring "all gender-based classifications" to be
analyzed under "heightened scrutiny."5 8 In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B.,59 the Supreme Court held that gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges in jury selection did not survive the heightened equal protec-
tion scrutiny that the Court has routinely required. The Court
explained that "[i]ntentional discrimination on the basis of gender by
state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where
. . . the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious,
archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men
and women."60 The Court further noted that sex discrimination has
had an unfortunate history, which warrants application of heightened
scrutiny for all gender based classifications.61
The Supreme Court most recently affirmed these principles in
United States v. Virginia,62 noting that it has "carefully inspected offi-
cial action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women."63 As
such, "'all gender-based classifications today' warrant 'heightened
scrutiny." 64 To withstand this heightened scrutiny, a party seeking
to uphold government action based on gender must offer an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for the classification.65
United States v. Virginia involved gender discrimination by the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI), the sole single-sex school among
Virginia's fifteen public institutions of higher learning.66 Responding
to the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the exclusion of women violated the
Equal Protection Clause, VMI proposed a parallel program for women:
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL).67 Although VWIL
proposed to share VMI's mission to produce "citizen soldiers," the
56. Id. at 210.
57. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996)(Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
58. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)(emphasis added). See
also United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996)(holding that a "sub-
stantive comparability" inquiry into a state's remedial plan for providing a sepa-
rate program for women who were not allowed to attend an all-male military
college as improper).
59. 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
60. Id. at 130-31.
61. Id. at 136.
62. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
63. Id. at 2275.
64. Id. at 2286 (emphasis added)(quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
136 (1994)).
65. Id. at 2271 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)).
66. Id. at 2269.
67. Id. at 2272.
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school differed from VMI in academic offerings, methods of education,
and financial resources.68
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, reasoned that because
the programs offered at VWIL were substantially inferior to those at
VMI, VMIs attempt to offer a parallel education at VWIL for women
failed to survive an equal protection attack.69 The Court further re-
viewed the history of discrimination against women, noting that "our
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination."70
Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state
government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or
official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizen-
ship stature-equal protection to aspire, achieve, participate in and contrib-
ute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.7 1
Furthermore, the purported state interests justifying the action or leg-
islation "must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation."72 In no case should the legislation "rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females."73
68. Id. Furthermore, "[tihe average combined SAT score of entrants at Mary Bald-
win (VWIL) is about 100 points lower than the score for VMI freshmen." Id. Ad-
ditional differences between VMI and VWIL included fewer instructors with
Ph.Ds, smaller endowments, and lower faculty salaries for the VWIL program.
Id.
69. Id. at 2279. Justice Ginsburg further noted that
[a] purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational options, as the
Court of Appeals recognized, is not served by VMI's historic and constant
plan-a plan to afford a unique educational benefit only to males. How-
ever "liberally" this plan serves the State's sons, it makes no provision
whatsoever for her daughters. That is not equal protection.
Id. (quotations omitted).
70. Id. at 2274-75 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). The
Court documented the history of gender discrimination, noting that for
a century plus three decades and more of that history, women did not
count among voters composing "We the People" .... And for a half a
century thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government,
both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities ac-
corded men so long as any "basis in reason" could be conceived for the
discrimination.
Id. at 2275 (citations omitted).
71. Id. See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)(invalidating a Louisiana
law that defined the husband as the "head and master" of property jointly owned
with his wife and gave him unilateral right to dispose of such property without
his wife's consent); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)(invalidating a Utah
requirement that parents support boys until age 21 and girls until age 18).
72. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
73. Id.
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IV. EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE STANDARD OF
SCRUTINY
Giving mandatory preference to members of one sex over members
of the other, simply to eliminate the necessity to decide an issue based
on the merits, is exactly the kind of arbitrary legislative choice that
the Equal Protection Clause is intended to prohibit.74 Although the
vast majority of cases involving prisoners' constitutional claims have
applied the heightened scrutiny analysis, 75 the Eighth Circuit never
reached the issue. The court required absolutely no showing of an ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification for providing female inmates with
manifestly inferior prison educational, vocational, and other pro-
grams and services.
The Eighth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Turner v. Safley76 for the proposition that a prison regulation
that impedes on inmates' rights is constitutional "if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests."77 Turner calls for applica-
tion of a lower standard of scrutiny in prisoner claims because "courts
are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration."78 The Supreme Court reasoned that because
courts have little knowledge of the "inordinately difficult" task of
prison operation, courts should accord prison authorities a high level
of deference. 79 Further, the Turner Court stated that permitting
courts to closely scrutinize prison officials' decisions would "distort the
decisionmaking process" and "seriously hamper [officials'] ability to
adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison ad-
ministration."80 Thus, although the Eighth Circuit never reached the
issue of the appropriate level of scrutiny, its references to the ration-
74. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
75. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Betts v. McCaughtry, No. 93-2929,
1994 WL 55562 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994)(unpublished disposition); Smith v. Bing-
ham, 914 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1990); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1456 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983); West v. Virginia
Dep't of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402, 405-06 (W.D. Va. 1994); McCoy v. Nevada
Dep't of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521, 523 (D. Nev. 1991)(citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)); McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp.
742 (W.D. La. 1982); Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 211 (W.D. Ky.
1982)(citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982));
Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1317 (S.D. W. Va. 1981); Batton v. State
Gov't of N.C., 501 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp.
1162, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1980)(citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976));
Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377
F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974); Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Cal. 1979).
76. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
77. Id. at 89.
78. Id. at 84.
79. Id. at 85.
80. Id. at 89.
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ale in Turner indicate that it would have applied the Turner standard
of scrutiny to the case if it had found that male and female inmates
were similarly situated.
The Turner inquiry, however, is markedly different from the re-
quired inquiry under heightened scrutiny. The programs in Turner
were not based on gender. Rather, the prison regulation barred corre-
spondence between inmates at different prisons for security reasons.8 1
The Turner analysis should be inapplicable in equal protection claims
because it would nullify the scrutiny standards carefully developed by
the Supreme Court. This nullification, in effect, would reduce all
equal protection inquiries to a rational basis standard.S2 Given the
Supreme Court's express recognition in Turner that the constitutional
right to be treated equally with those similarly situated does not end
once prisoners are incarcerated without compromising the Supreme
Court's standards,83 application of the deferential Turner standard
to gender-based equal protection claims would be particularly
inappropriate.
Nowhere in the Eighth Circuit's opinion does the court even ad-
dress heightened scrutiny or the important concerns it is designed to
accommodate. Instead, it superimposed a threshold standard requir-
ing the female inmates to prove that they were similarly situated to
male inmates. According to the court, only upon proof that the two
classes are so situated can heightened scrutiny be applied. The
Eighth Circuit panel dismissed the district court's finding that the
programs at NCW were based upon stereotypical and archaic notions
and were, therefore, inferior programs and services. After ignoring
the district court's essential fact finding function, the appeals panel
simply concluded the programs and the State's justifications for main-
taining the inferior programs escaped any scrutiny in the equal pro-
tection analysis.
As will be shown in the arguments to follow, the district court, not
the two judges in the majority on the Eighth Circuit Klinger panel,
was correct in applying heightened scrutiny in the context of disparate
treatment in Nebraska's women's prisons. The appropriate standard
should require the court to analyze inmates' claims of sexual discrimi-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause and utilize the heightened
scrutiny standard. The decisions of prison officials should not remain
unrestricted at the expense of women inmates' constitutional rights.84
81. Id.
82. See Laddy, supra note 9, at 17.
83. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
84. Laddy, supra note 9, at 16.
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V. EIGHTH CIRCUITS THRESHOLD SIMILARLY SITUATED
STANDARD
In Klinger, the district court provided five reasons for concluding
that the women inmates were similarly situated to the male inmates.
First, the women inmates and men inmates were both prisoners incar-
cerated in Nebraska institutions.8 5 Second, comparing programs at
the two institutions was appropriate because the DCS classified NSP
and NCW inmates as "roughly comparable" with respect to custody
levels.8 6 Third, the penal purposes of incarceration were the same for
men and women.8 7 Fourth, the district court distinguished an earlier
Nebraska case, Timm v. Gunter,88 in which the Eighth Circuit held
that the two institutions were not similarly situated for purposes of
privacy rights because of different security concerns at the two institu-
tions.8 9 Finally, the court concluded that the appropriate place to ac-
count for differences between the two institutions was at the
heightened scrutiny stage and not at the similarly situated stage.9 0
The Eighth Circuit, however, held that to present a cognizable
equal protection claim, one must first prove as a threshold matter that
he or she is similarly situated to the group receiving the allegedly
favorable treatment. 9 1 As such, the court concluded that before the
merits of the case could be discussed, it must first be determined
whether the female inmates at NCW were similarly situated to the
male inmates at NSP.92 The court held that women inmates could not
meet this burden, reasoning that women inmates have different char-
acteristics altogether that prevents them from being similarly situ-
ated to male prisoners.9 3 Yet, the appeals court never engaged in a
discussion of how these special characteristics were relevant to the
85. Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1388-89 (D.
Neb. 1993).
86. Id. at 1389.
87. Id.
88. 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990).
89. KInger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (D.
Neb. 1993).
90. Id. at 1390. The district court then proceeded to compare the programs and serv-
ices at NCW with those at NSP on a program-by-program basis. It generally
concluded that invidious sex discrimination existed wherever the plaintiffs re-
ceived a substantially inferior program or service as compared to NSP inmates,
rejecting the reasons that the defendants proffered for the difference in treat-
ment. Id. at 1316. The court found that the plaintiffs suffered a "substantial
burden" as to approximately 19 programs and services and that the defendants
had failed to show that such differing treatment was justified under heightened
scrutiny. Id. at 1396-452. Thus, the court concluded, the defendants violated the
plaintiffs' equal protection rights. Id.
91. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 732.
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DCS's decision to provide women with dramatically inferior vocational
and rehabilitative programs. Instead, the court concluded that prison
priorities differed because of the size of the prison and characteristics
of the inmates. Based on those two distinctions, the appeals court
stated that "dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does
not violate equal protection."94
In reaching its decision, the appeals court relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,95 which
held that the Equal Protection Clause generally requires the govern-
ment to treat similarly situated people alike. The Court in Cleburne,
however, did not create a similarly situated threshold test as part of
its equal protection analysis. Instead, the Court used the phrase "sim-
ilarly situated" to mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires
similarly situated people be treated alike.96 Although the term itself
often appears in equal protection cases, the Supreme Court has never
required that plaintiffs claiming a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause prove as a threshold matter, before application of the standard
of review, that they are "similarly situated" to those receiving the al-
legedly favorable treatment.
Although the United States Supreme Court has stated that mem-
bers of different gender groups can be situated differently for constitu-
tional purposes,97 it is usually found in very narrow circumstances. 98
For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court,99 the Supreme Court
considered whether a California statute that prohibited a male from
having sexual intercourse with a minor female, but not prohibiting a
female from having sexual intercourse with a minor male, violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court
first determined that California's strong interest in "the prevention of
illegitimate pregnancy" was an important governmental interest.oo
Next, the Court determined "that young men and young women are
not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of
sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant ... ."101 The
Court therefore concluded that the statute's distinction between men
and women was substantially related to an important governmental
interest.10 2
The courts finding that men and women were not similarly situ-
ated did not end the analysis; rather, the finding merely focused it.
94. Id. at 731.
95. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
96. Id. at 441.
97. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
98. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
99. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
100. Id. at 470.
101. Id. at 471.
102. Id. at 473-74.
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The Supreme Court has employed a similar procedure in other equal
protection cases, using the similarly situated requirement to lay the
foundation for the analysis of the level of scrutiny appropriate in all
equal protection cases.1 0 3 In each case, the Supreme Court has re-
quired the defendant to show that the gender-based discrimination ex-
amined in its similarly situated analysis was related to an important
governmental interest.
The ultimate conclusion that two groups are not similarly situated
simply cannot be made as a threshold matter. Such a conclusion can
be reached only after discussing the applicable standard of scrutiny.
The Eighth Circuit effectively switched both the inquiry and the bur-
den of proof in equal protection cases by requiring plaintiffs to prove
that they are similarly situated to their male counterparts before the
court will apply the constitutionally required level of scrutiny. This
approach gives prison administrators nearly unrestricted authority.
According to the court's rationale, there is no longer any need to have
an "exceedingly persuasive" reason, or any reason for that matter, for
treating male and female inmates differently. This reasoning will
subject female inmates to inferior treatment with constitutional impu-
nity by ignoring blatant gender discrimination.L0 4 To begin to solve
this apparent problem, the burden should be placed on the State to
meet the heightened scrutiny test rather than on the plaintiffs to es-
tablish situational similarity.
In determining that women inmates were not "similarly situated"
to male inmates, the appeals court considered variables that, even
taken together, failed to sustain its findings. First, the court deter-
mined that NSP is larger and houses more violent criminals with
longer sentences.1 0 5 Furthermore, the court noted that women in-
mates have different characteristics altogether: they are more likely
to be primary caregivers and to be victims of physical or sexual
abuse.10 6 Thus, the court concluded that prison priorities differed be-
cause of these differences in prison size and inmate characteristics.10 7
103. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981)(applying heightened scru-
tiny to examine the constitutionality of a statute authorizing military registra-
tion of males but not females, even after holding that women and men were not
similarly situated with regard to military assignments and the ability to engage
in combat); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)(concluding that mothers and
fathers of illegitimate children were not similarly situated, and then determining
whether the statutory classification was rationally related to a permissible state
objective).
104. Laddy, supra note 9, at 22.
105. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. at 732.
107. Id. ("In short, NSP and NCW are different institutions with different inmates
each operating with limited resources to fulfill different specific needs. Thus,
whether NCW lacks one program that NSP has proves almost nothing." (citation
omitted)).
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The court's analysis seems driven by its conclusion that the DCS was
operating under "the restrictions of a limited budget and... the differ-
ence [in] institution size."1 08 Such practical considerations, however,
may not be used to "justify official inaction or legislative unwillingness
to operate a prison system in a constitutional manner."1 09
Furthermore, financial hardship is no defense to sex discrimina-
tion in prisons.1 10 In West v. Virginia Department of Corrections,1 1 1 a
female inmate raised an equal protection claim to the Department of
Corrections challenging the vocational and educational programs in
the all-female prison as compared to those at the male-only prison. In
response to the defendants' argument that the differences were justi-
fied due to lack of financial resources,1 12 the court held that "[ilf de-
fendants' argument [was] carried to its logical extension, then the
same argument could be used to deny women inmates the opportunity
for education, vocational training or rehabilitation. Surely such an in-
equitable distribution of resources is not contemplated by the Four-
teenth Amendment."1 13
The differences between male and female prisoners, however, result from in-
carceration in very different institutions, or reflect the particular characteris-
tics associated with female crime. The former is attributable to the
classification itself, while the latter is at least partly a consequence of the dif-
ferent treatment of women in the criminal justice system. Because they can
be traced to official discrimination, these differences cannot render men and
women dissimilarly situated with respect to incarceration.11 4
In determining whether male and female inmates are similarly sit-
uated for the purpose of prison programs, courts traditionally consider
variables such as custody level, sentence structure, purpose of incar-
ceration, goals of rehabilitation, need for prison programs, function of
the institutions, and inmates' capability of participating in and bene-
fitting from a program.1 5 The Eighth Circuit, however, looked in-
stead at the characteristics of the male and female inmates, such as
the probability that women were more likely than men to be abuse
victims or to be single parents, while men tend to be more violent and
108. Id. at 736 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
109. Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1980)(quoting Glover v.
Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1979)). See also Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977)(holding that savings in time, money, and effort do
not justify gender-based discrimination).
110. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)(holding that while states have a
valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of programs, it may not accomplish
such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of citizens).
111. 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994).
112. Id. at 406-07.
113. Id. at 407.
114. Rosemary Herbert, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94 YALE
L.J. 1182, 1189 (1985)(footnotes omitted).
115. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMil-
lian, J., dissenting).
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predatory.116 The Eighth Circuit refused to even consider the reasons
why the programs and facilities at NCW are different than, and in
most instances inferior to, the programs and facilities at NSP. The
court justified this decision based on its determination that because
"so many variables affect the mix of programming" at each institution,
"comparing programs at NSP to those at NCW is like the proverbial
comparison of apples to oranges."ll7 This type of analysis contravenes
Supreme Court precedent that establishes gender classifications re-
flecting gender stereotypes are unconstitutional even if there is some
truth to the stereotype."38 "In determining whether male and female
inmates are similarly situated, courts should consider factors such as
purposes of incarceration and need rather than cost-driven, gender
proxy differences between prison populations."119
The Eighth Circuit further noted that a party cannot establish that
female and male inmates are similarly situated by employing a pro-
gram-by-program comparison.120 The court reasoned that permitting
this type of comparison to establish the requirement that groups be
similarly situated would subject prison officials' decisions to close
scrutiny and hamper officials' ability to adopt innovative solutions to
the unique problems of prison administration.12 1 This would place
"the burden on prison officials to explain decisions that resulted from
the complicated interplay of many variables-some of which were be-
yond their control-and thus are not susceptible to ready
explanation."'12 2
The Eighth Circuit facilitates the use of gender discrimination
based on outdated views of women and impermissible generalizations.
The nineteenth century movement to establish reformatories for wo-
men initiated the practice of offering women inmates inferior pro-
grams and services. The movement was based, in part, on a belief in
the malleability of the female character.12 3 Traditional women's roles
116. Id. at 733.
117. Id.
118. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994). Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Conner noted that
[t]he Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this Court,
acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in some stereo-
types, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before mak-
ing judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to
perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination.
Id. See also Laddy, supra note 9, at 21.
119. See Laddy, supra note 9, at 21 (citing Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31
F.3d 727, 735 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMillian, J., dissenting)).
120. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMil-
lian, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 733 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
122. Id.
123. CLARICME FEnmAN, WOMEN IN THE CRIn~IAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 40-42, 44 (1980).
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were the model for these rehabilitative efforts. To this end, the
reformatories taught domestic skills and emphasized the duties to
family.124 Although these stereotypes were once used, "such classifi-
cations may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women."125 Although "inher-
ent differences" certainly exist between males and females, these dif-
ferences may not be used as "denigration of the members of either sex
or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity."126
These ideas and programs will continue to thrive after the Eighth
Circuit reinforced such stereotypes. While certain differences between
male and female inmates emphasized in Klinger are factual, such as
the likelihood that women are more likely than men to be abuse vic-
tims and single parents, these differences only support the need for
equal training and education programs. 127 Indeed, the appeals court's
reasoning instructs that if a court is able to articulate any statistical
difference between men and women-whether or not relevant to the
challenged disparity-then the court need not bother analyzing the
challenged disparity.128
VI. EIGHTH CIRCUITS ALTERNATE HOLDING OF PROVING
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the constitu-
tionality of a government classification based on gender must be deter-
mined by asking whether the classification is substantially related to
an important government objective.129 As applied, the district court
correctly reasoned that the offering of educational, vocational, and
recreational programs only in the men's prison, without offering
124. Id. at 44-45. See also Herbert, supra note 114, at 1192.
125. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996)(citation omitted).
126. Id.
127. The female inmates incarcerated at NCW are for the most part poor,
undereducated, and lack the vocational training necessary to become
self-supporting. The female inmates' gender places them at the bottom
of the list of the unemployed and unemployables in this country. In
other words, gender itself will disadvantage the female inmates as they
attempt to enter or re-enter the workforce.
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 735 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMil-
Han, J., dissenting).
128. See Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 952 (D.C. Cir.
1996)(Rogers, J. dissenting). "Under the court's rationale, it would almost seem
that the District could send men to a country club and women to the Black Hole of
Calcutta; a difference in treatment the women received there would be ascribed
to their dissimilar situation and would require no further justification." Id.
129. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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equivalent programs in the women's prison, constituted a denial of
benefits to female prisoners because of sex.13 0
Despite this clear standard, the Eighth Circuit determined in an
alternate holding that the district court's analysis impermissibly re-
lieved the plaintiffs of their burden of proving purposeful or inten-
tional discrimination.131 Furthermore, the appeals court held that
the Nebraska statutes relating to prison programming were facially
neutral. 132 The appeals court relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Personnel Administrator v. Feeneyl33 to justify its departure from
precedent. Feeney held that discriminatory intent must be proved
when a classification is not overtly or covertly based on gender and
when the challenge is based upon disparate "impact" rather than dis-
parate treatment. 13 4 Pointing out that female inmates had not di-
rectly challenged the underlying practice of incarcerating men and
women in separate facilities,135 the court erroneously concluded the
women had not challenged a "facial" gender classification. Because
the women failed in this respect, they had the burden under Feeney of
proving that their disparate treatment was the result of purposeful or
intentional discrimination.136
The Eighth Circuit's reliance on Feeney is misplaced. Feeney ap-
plies only when the discrimination claim is based on the effects of a
neutral law, not when the law or state action is facially gender-
based.137 In Feeney, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts statute under the Equal Protection Clause. The stat-
ute gave veterans a distinct advantage in obtaining jobs in the Massa-
chusetts civil service. Although the advantage applied to any veteran,
130. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 739 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMil-
lian, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 733-34.
132. Id. at 734. The court provided the following example:
NSP has 24-hour medical service available; two other all-male institu-
tions and NCW lack 24-hour medical service. There is clearly no "facial
gender classification" regarding 24-hour medical service where both
male and female prisoners are in the group deprived of the program.
Thus, determining whether the plaintiffs receive inferior programs be-
cause of their sex or for some other reason requires looking beyond the
fact that female prisoners are segregated from men and examining the
reasons behind the defendants' programming decisions.
Id.
133. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
134. Id. at 273-74.
135. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 734 (8th Cir. 1994). Instead,
the plaintiffs contended that the policy of housing men and women in separate
institutions had been applied in such a manner as to "relegate women to an infer-
ior opportunity to take advantage of academic, vocational, and training opportu-
nities." Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 211 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
136. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 734 (8th Cir. 1994).
137. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
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male or female, the statute advantaged male applicants because male
veterans were more numerous than female veterans. The plaintiff in
Feeney argued that the resulting advantage disproportionately
harmed women because the impact of the veterans preference law se-
verely limited public employment opportunities for women.138
The Feeney Court acknowledged that gender-based classifications
should be evaluated under the heightened scrutiny standard. 139 The
Court went on to hold, however, that the essential inquiry involving
facially neutral statutes is whether the adverse impact reflects in-
tended discrimination. 14 0 Accordingly, the Court held that the statute
did not unconstitutionally discriminate against women absent proof
that the discriminatory impact on women was intentional.14 1
The Feeney holding instructs that when a government's action dis-
tinguishes on its face between two classes, the discriminatory intent is
express and additional proof of discriminatory intent is not required.
Purposeful discrimination is "the condition that offends the Constitu-
tion."14 2 When a facially neutral statute or policy has a disparate im-
pact on one particular class of people, however, the discriminatory
intent is not explicit. It is necessary, in those cases only, to provide
special proof that the disparate impact was the result of intentional
discrimination. 143 Supreme Court cases following Feeney recognize
this distinction. 144
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's opinion, the district court did not
assume that any inferior program or service at NCW was the product
of intentional discrimination. 14 5 By analyzing whether the DCS's un-
equal allocation of programs and services responded substantially to
138. Id. at 271.
139. Id. at 273.
140. Id. at 274.
141. Id. at 281.
142. Id. at 274 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1970)).
143. Id. See also Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1979). The court in
Marshall held that "purposeful discrimination is the subject of the inquiry absent
a discernable, non-neutral legislative or administrative classification subject to
the important governmental interest/substantial relation test." Id. at 1299.
14-*. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)(holding that a
policy of excluding males from a single-sex nursing school violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause without requiring further proof of intent to discriminate); Wash-
ington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)(holding that a race-based
nonbusing initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause without requiring proof
of intent to discriminate); Kirchburg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)(holding
that a statute granting to a husband exclusive control of disposition of commu-
nity property was unconstitutional and violated the Equal Protection Clause
without requiring proof of intentional discrimination).
145. Elinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 739 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMil-
lian, J., dissenting). The district court's framework for analyzing the equal pro-
tection claims involved determining
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an important governmental interest, the district court completed its
task of determining whether or not invidious discrimination ex-
isted. 146 It is the defendant's burden to show an "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" for the classification.' 4 7  Plaintiffs should be
required to carry the burden of proving a facially discriminatory regu-
lation. Nevertheless, arriving at the conclusion that the classification
between the female and male inmates in Nebraska was "facially neu-
tral," the Eighth Circuit created an artificial and unprecedented dis-
tinction between (1) facial segregation of men and women, and (2) the
challenged treatment inherent in such a segregated assignment. Fe-
male inmates, "as a result of their gender alone, can receive only the
programs available at NCW."148
Since its decision in Reed, which requires a higher level of analysis
for gender discrimination claims, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to wo-
men, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal
opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society
based on their individual talents and capacities."149 Courts that have
addressed this issue have uniformly agreed that when the conse-
quence of gender-based segregation is gross inferiority, courts should
whether there are programs (means) afforded (in quantity or quality) to
male inmates at NSP but not female inmates at NCW which place a
"substantial burden" on female inmates (disparity); ... if so, ascertain
whether there is an important governmental objective (objective) which
underlies the "means";... if so, finally decide whether the 'means" cho-
sen to further the governmental "objective" are directly and substan-
tially related to the "objective" (relationship of means to objective) such
that the "disparity" may be overlooked.
Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1391 (D.
Neb. 1993).
146. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 739 (8th Cir. 1994)(McMil-
lian, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1388 (D.
Neb. 1993). The district court further noted that
[t]here is only one prison for women in the State of Nebraska. Whether
a woman is convicted of writing bad checks or of murder, she will find
herself at NCW when sentenced to prison. Men, on the other hand,
could be sent to a variety of institutions depending upon a variety of
penological goals-from security to programming. As a consequence, de-
spite the fact that nongender-related reasons may exist to justify treat-
ing female prisoners differently from male prisoners, the fact remains
that female prisoners, as a result of their gender alone, can receive only
the programs available at NCW. Therefore, if the programming at NCW
is comparatively inferior to programs at NSP, the female recipients may
receive poor programming because of their gender and not for some
nongender-related reason.
Id.
149. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
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apply heightened scrutiny without requiring plaintiffs to prove inten-
tional discrimination.150
The Eighth Circuit's holding in Klinger insulates government deci-
sions and regulations that allocate government benefits and burdens
based on gender. Instead, the circuit decided to require plaintiffs to
challenge, as intentional discrimination, neutral appropriation and
authorization laws.
VII. CASES SINCE KLINGER
The courts in the Eighth Circuit continue to require plaintiffs who
claim an equal protection violation to prove, as a threshold, that they
are similarly situated to the party allegedly receiving favorable treat-
ment. For example, in Walker v. Nelson,151 a case decided one month
after Klinger, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim after determin-
ing that they were not similarly situated to other inmates. The plain-
tiffs in Walker were inmates convicted of second degree murder. They
claimed that the Governor of Nebraska and Nebraska Attorney Gen-
eral denied them equal protection rights by adopting a policy that de-
nied commutation of second degree murder sentences because of
parole eligibility.152 The trial court was quick to cite the Eighth Cir-
cuit decision for the proposition that "dissimilar treatment of dissimi-
larly situated people does not violate equal protection."'15 3
Consequently, the Walker court held that fundamental differences ex-
isted between second degree murderers sentenced to ten years to life
and first degree murderers serving life sentences in Nebraska.15 4 The
150. See, e.g., Batton v. North Carolina, 501 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.C. 1980)(holding
that where female inmates were incarcerated at an all-female institution rather
than any other prison operated by the Department solely because of their gender,
a facial discrimination analysis to equal protection claims is warranted where the
women received inferior vocational training opportunities); Glover v. Johnson,
478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. MVich. 1979)(holding that where the actual consequence
of a seemingly harmless classification reveals disparate treatment, there is ample
justification to treat the classification and its consequence together to determine
the "fit" between this end result and the governmental interest).
151. 863 F. Supp. 1059 (D. Neb. 1994).
152. Id. at 1061.
153. Id. at 1064 (quoting Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th
Cir. 1994)). Thus, the court also felt compelled to conclude that
the first step in analyzing an equal protection claim is to discern
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that he was treated differently
from others who were similarly situated to him. Without a threshold
showing that he is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive spe-
cial treatment, a plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim.
Id. (citation omitted). See also State v. Atkins, 230 Neb. 315, 320-21, 549 N.W.2d
159, 163 (1996)(holding that a provision for good time to city and county inmates
on unequal basis is not a violation of equal protection because the city and county
inmates are not similarly situated to state prison inmates).
154. Walker v. Nelson, 863 F. Supp. 1059, 1065 (D. Neb. 1994).
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primary difference that the court felt was controlling was that inmates
serving a life sentence for second degree murder are automatically eli-
gible for parole after ten years. First degree murderers, on the other
hand, are never eligible for parole unless the life sentence is com-
muted. Even if first degree murderers' sentences are commuted, the
court reasoned that they were not similarly situated to second degree
murderers because there was no evidence establishing that the first
degree murderers actually served less time than the second degree
murderers.15 5 After concluding that the plaintiffs were not similarly
situated to first degree murderers, the court's opinion ended. No-
where did the court mention the level of scrutiny to be applied to the
conduct of the state.15 6
Since Klinger, the Eighth Circuit has confronted equal protection
claims by women inmates in two virtually identical cases. In Pargo v.
Elliott,157 the court affirmed a decision by the district court and dis-
missed the female inmates' claims. The inmates claimed that they
were unconstitutionally treated in comparison with their male coun-
terparts.158 The claims mirrored much of the argument that the
plaintiffs in Klinger had raised: inferior educational and vocational
training, and inferior inmate privileges. 15 9 In addition, the inmates
contended that women inmates in other security classification levels
did not have the same legal assistance, work release, behavior modifi-
cation classes, sex offender therapy programs, and yard and library
privileges as those available to men inmates with the same classifica-
tion.160 Like the plaintiffs in Klinger, however, the inmates did not
challenge the regulation requiring women inmates to be segregated
from male inmates or claim discriminatory funding.161 The district
court, applying as a threshold matter the similarly situated analysis,
held that the women inmates were not similarly situated to their male
counterparts. 162 The court rejected the claim that for purposes of
equal protection, "inmates are inmates," which thus satisifies the sim-
ilarly situated analysis.16 3 Instead, the court applied factors such as
155. Id.
156. The court did mention in dicta that even if the plaintiffs were similarly situated
to first degree murderers, the equal protection claim would still fail because such
a violation cannot be founded on "theoretical possibilities." Id. The court failed,
however, to apply any level of scrutiny to the challenged policy.
157. 69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 98 (1996).
158. Id. at 281.
159. Id. Specifically, the inmates alleged that the women are classified in a different
manner, live in more confined housing, have fewer off-ground work opportunities,
less library time and yard privileges, participate in different substance abuse pro-
grams, and see visitors in more restrictive settings. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1261 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
163. Id. at 1253.
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population, average security levels, types of crimes, and average
length of sentence as key factors to determine that the women inmates
were not similarly situated to their male counterparts.164 Instead of
ending the analysis at that point, however, the district court pro-
ceeded with further discussion regarding the level of appropriate scru-
tiny.165 The court recognized that ending the analysis after the
preliminary similarly situated inquiry would be inappropriate. 16 6
The problem with this approach is that instead of utilizing the
heightened scrutiny analysis mandated by Craig v. Boren16 7 and
United States v. Virginia,168 the court analyzed the inmates' claims
under the rational basis model. The court, following the Klinger ex-
ample, held that because the women inmates had not cited to any
facially gender-based state law, general budgetary decisions, or policy
choices in support of their claims, the claims could not be based on a
facial classification.169 Furthermore, the inmates failed to challenge
the decision to segregate men and women inmates, or any budget allo-
cation for the prison.170 Although the court recognized that when a
plaintiff challenges a facially discriminatory policy, the court is com-
pelled to review the actions under a heightened scrutiny,'71 the court
also recognized, relying on Feeney, that the inmates failed to present
evidence of policies that were motivated by discriminatory intent.
Thus, the plaintiffs' claim did not trigger the heightened scrutiny
analysis.' 7 2
According to the district court in Pargo, the only time heightened
scrutiny is warranted in a prisoner's equal protection claim is when
the prisoner alleges differences in the process by which program deci-
164. Id. at 1254-61. After analyzing each factor, the court came to the following
conclusions:
First, the women's institution uniquely combines all security levels of
inmates. Women inmates constitute a very small portion (6%) of the to-
tal prison population, so they all can be housed at a single institution.
Second, women generally spend less time in prison than men because
women generally are sentenced for fewer crimes, and for less serious
crimes. Women often are paroled earlier than men because they are con-
sidered to be lower risk parolees. Third, characteristics common to in-
mates at the women's institution are different from characteristics of
inmates at men's institutions. The differences among the various men's
institutions and ICIW are so significant that comparisons between the
two would ignore "separate sets of decisions based on entirely different
circumstances."
Id. at 1261 (footnotes omitted).
165. Id. at 1262-65.
166. Id. at 1262.
167. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
168. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).





sions are made, as opposed to alleging differences in the programs be-
tween prisons.173 Again relying on the Klinger precedent, the district
court held that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving intentional
discrimination, a burden that the plaintiffs could not meet.1 74 Thus,
although the court discussed the merits of the case despite the court's
determination that the plaintiffs were not similarly situated to male
inmates, it bypassed the crucial heightened scrutiny analysis because
the plaintiffs had not challenged the segregation policy itself.
Similarly, in Keevan v. Smith,i75 the Eighth Circuit, with one
judge dissenting, dismissed the equal protection claims brought by fe-
male inmates housed at two Missouri penal institutions. The plain-
tiffs contended that the Department of Corrections' policy for
determining the placement of prison industry employment violated
the Equal Protection Clause.1 7 6 Affirming the Klinger similarly situ-
ated standard, the court held that because male and female inmates
are not similarly situated, offering different prison industry employ-
ment to males and females could not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.77
As in Klinger, the court alternatively held that even if the male
and female inmates were similarly situated for purposes of the place-
ment of prison industries, the allegedly unequal treatment stemmed
from a facially neutral policy, and thus the plaintiffs were required to
establish that the alleged disparate impact was the result of a discrim-
inatory purpose. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
discriminatory purpose because "[d]epartment officials testified that
the location of prison industries was motivated not by stereotypes but
by legitimate concerns such as work force stability and proximity to
clientele."178 Virtually eliminating any future claim of inferior pro-
grams and services brought by female inmates, the court further
noted that "[wihen attempts are made to compare programs offered at
facilities housing inmates who are not similarly situated, 'it is hardly
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1265. In finding no evidence of invidious discrimination, the court held
that all of the challenged policies were gender neutral in design and application.
Moreover, the court held that there was a rational basis for the implementation
of the policies. Id. at 1291.
175. 100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 645.
177. Id. at 649-50. The court considered the same factors as those in Klinger, includ-
ing prison population size, average length of stay, security classification, types of
crimes, and other special characteristics. Id. at 648.
178. Id. at 651. For example, the industrial opportunities offered to female inmates
were primarily that of telephone operators, data entry workers, and copying posi-
tions, which fall within the prevailing stereotypes of "women's work." Id. at 653
(Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination, that the smaller cor-
rectional facility offered fewer programs than the larger one.'" 7 9
In Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia,1O the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia relied on both Klinger and Pargo and va-
cated the district court's order that required the prison officials to up-
grade the work, recreational, and religious programs available to
female inmates.181 The court noted that the female inmates were not
similarly situated to male inmates at a different prison.182 The court
reasoned that "the difference in the number of programs provided by
prisons having vastly different numbers of inmates cannot be taken as
evidence that those in small institutions that offer fewer programs
have been denied equal protection. More than that is required."18 3
Unfortunately, however, the court does not mention what more plain-
tiffs would be required to show before a court would find in the plain-
tiffs' favor.
Furthermore, the Women Prisoners court attempted to distinguish
United States v. Virginia18 4 by reasoning that while the Supreme
Court focused on disparities in financial resources available to the two
educational institutions, the women inmates had not alleged that the
District of Columbia allocated fewer resources per female inmate.i8 5
Therefore, the court concluded Virginia was inapplicable because the
inmates' claim was that the District "mismanaged the resources allo-
cated to female inmates by failing to provide them with the identical
programs offered to the men,"18 6 not that the two prisons offered
vastly different programs, as revealed in Virginia.
As in Klinger, the District of Columbia court's equal protection
analysis in Women Prisoners is flawed. Rather than examine whether
the government can justify its separate and unequal treatment of the
sexes, the court concluded that equal protection does not even apply
because the male and female inmates are not "similarly situated."' 8 7
179. Id. (quoting Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 925 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
180. 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
181. Id. at 924-26.
182. Id. The court quoted favorably from Klinger for the proposition that "dissimilar
treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection." Id.
at 924 (quoting Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.
1994)).
183. Id. at 925.
184. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
185. Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 951 (Rogers, J., dissenting). As the dissent correctly pointed out:
Two people commit the same crime. Each is similarly convicted by a
District of Columbia court. In all respects--criminal history, family cir-
cumstances, education, drug use, favorite baseball team-they are iden-
tical. All save one, that is: they are of different sexes. Solely because of
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This analysis "stands the concept of equal protection on its head"l8 8 by
relying "on the very dissimilarity it has created to justify discrimina-
tion in the provision of benefits."1S 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Klinger represents an inexcusable
departure from the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
By adopting a "similarly situated" test,190 the court uses its conclusion
that men and women are treated differently to foreclose consideration
of the essential constitutional question: whether that different treat-
ment substantially advances an important governmental objective. If
the equal protection inquiry ended every time a plaintiff failed to es-
tablish different treatment at a substantially similar facility, Klinger
"stand[s] for the proposition that women and men prison inmates can
never be similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis"
despite the court's contrary assertion.19 1
The consequences of the decision in Klinger extend far beyond the
specific facts of the case. First, the "similarly situated" test will allow
the government to avoid application of the appropriate level of scru-
tiny simply by arguing that the plaintiff and the person or persons
receiving the allegedly favorable treatment are not similarly situ-
ated.1 92 Second, Klinger requires a plaintiff to prove an intent to dis-
criminate in every equal protection claim resulting from state action
that facially discriminates between men and women. 1 93 Conse-
quently, the Eighth Circuit has effectively eliminated the possibility
that women inmates could ever establish an equal protection violation.
Angie Baker '98
that difference, they are sent to different facilities at which the man en-
joys superior programming options.
... The court relies on the different characteristics of the facilities to
conclude that the otherwise identical men and women incarcerated
therein are not similarly situated, and on that basis holds that there can
be no judicial comparison of the differences in the treatment accorded to
them.
Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994).
191. Pargo v. Elliott, 49 F.3d 1355, 1356 (8th Cir. 1995).
192. See Laddy, supra note 9.
193. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1994).
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